On 26 October 2025, the White House published a series of agreements with four Southeast Asian countries. Agreements with Malaysia and Cambodia took the form of final trade agreements, while agreements with Thailand and Vietnam took the form of “joint statements” on “frameworks” regarding reciprocal trade.
These agreements arise within the context of U.S. President Donald Trump’s signature “reciprocal trade” policy. After initially unveiling reciprocal tariff rates on April 2, the President postponed the imposition of those tariffs, then reset tariff levels for almost every country, all while negotiating trade agreements with certain countries and increasing duty rates for others.
Below, we provide a brief overview of these agreements and explain how novel provisions in these agreements could affect producers in each of the four affected countries. We conclude with an assessment of the enforceability of these agreements, particularly given the U.S. Supreme Court’s pending decision regarding the legality of reciprocal tariffs. Should you have any questions regarding the impact of these new developments, please do not hesitate to contact us.
(1) Reciprocal Tariffs
In a 5 September 2025 Executive Order, President Trump articulated the role of framework agreements and trade agreements vis-à-vis reciprocal tariffs and section 232 tariffs. According to the Executive Order, section 232 duties and reciprocal tariff rates will generally not be narrowed in scope except for where partners have agreed to a framework agreement or trade agreement. Partners who do reach such agreements with the U.S. may see modifications to their overall reciprocal tariff rate and section 232 rates. However, the Executive Order stipulates that the only products eligible for a zero percent rate are: products that cannot be grown, mined, or naturally produced in the United States or grown, mined, or naturally produced in sufficient quantities in the United States to satisfy domestic demand; certain agricultural products; aircraft and aircraft parts; and non-patented articles for use in pharmaceutical applications.
A full list of those products is included at Annex III to the Executive Order.
The agreements struck with the four Southeast Asian countries follow this general template. For each country, the reciprocal tariff rate remains in place, while certain items consistent with Annex III of the aforementioned Executive Order are carved out. By contrast, each country has agreed to provide significant preferential market access to U.S. goods. For example, the Cambodia agreement specifically removes duties on 100% of U.S. goods, and the Vietnam framework agreement provides that Vietnam will provide preferential market access to “substantially all” U.S. industrial and agricultural goods.
(2) Domestic Policy and Labor
In addition to tariff concessions, the four partner countries each agreed to conform significant aspects of domestic policy (referred to in the agreements as non-tariff barriers) to meet U.S. demands. Most of the “non- tariff barriers” addressed in the agreements are unlikely to affect producers in the four countries, because they are generally targeted at providing market access for U.S. producers in politically sensitive industries. For example, three of the four agreements (all but Vietnam) impose significant limitations on digital trade actions taken by the partner countries. Other areas of regulation addressed in the agreements, such as environmental protections, are ambiguous and unlikely to result in major changes in domestic policy.
However, provisions on labor in particular are likely to result in significant compliance risks for producers in these countries. The Cambodia and Malaysia agreements (at Article 2.9) require both countries to adopt prohibitions on imports of goods made using forced labor, and provide that these countries may acknowledge U.S. government determinations regarding entities and products made using forced labor. It is unclear whether the Thailand and Vietnam agreements, once implemented, will contain similar provisions.
The United States has established a rebuttable presumption that certain goods, particularly those made in China’s Xinjiang region or made by producers with ties to the Xinjiang region, are made using forced labor. The practical implication of rebuttable presumptions of forced labor is that U.S. importers must prove to U.S. Customs and Border Protection that no part or component of an imported good was made using forced labor. For many U.S. producers, the most efficient option is to cut certain countries out of their supply chains entirely. The imposition of similar compliance burdens on Cambodian and Malaysian producers could be especially problematic for producers in those countries, given the countries’ close trade partnerships with China. Moreover, certain members of Congress have suggested expanding the United States’ approach on forced labor to apply to more countries and producers, such as producers of cobalt from the Democratic Republic of Congo. Producers in these four countries, even if they do not export to the U.S., should be aware of these requirements and of the potential need to establish that forced labor is not part of their supply chains.
(3) Sanctions and Export Controls
All four agreements also contain provisions requiring varying degrees of action on sanctions and export controls. While the Thailand and Vietnam agreements do not address sanctions, the Cambodia and Malaysia agreements (at Article 5.2) provide that both countries shall “cooperate” with the U.S. on sanctions, “with a view to restricting transactions of its nationals with individuals and entities” on sanctions lists maintained by the U.S. Department of Commerce and Department of the Treasury. Notably, the wording of these provisions suggests that the U.S. intends to enforce these measures extraterritorially, albeit with the cooperation of the respective national authorities.
With respect to export controls, all four agreements similarly suggest the extraterritorial application of U.S. measures. The Thailand and Vietnam agreements indicate that both countries will “cooperate” on export controls. While the Malaysia requires Malaysia to “align with unilateral controls” imposed by the U.S., the Cambodia agreement specifically states that Cambodia shall align with U.S. export controls “on a case-by-case basis, based on requests by the [U.S.]”. Producers in all four countries of merchandise subject to U.S. export controls (for example semiconductors) and with significant customer bases in countries like China, Iran, and Russia, should be attuned to the possibility of becoming embroiled in U.S.-led sanctions and export control measures as a result of these agreements.
(4) Economic and National Security Provisions
The Cambodia and Malaysia agreements contain especially unusual provisions regarding “economic and national security”. Beyond the sanction and compliance provisions addressed above, provisions in those two agreements require the countries to effectively mirror certain U.S. duties, and establish their own measures for addressing dumping and subsidies (Article 5.1). Further, both agreements contain what is being referred to as a “poison pill” provision. If either country enters into a bilateral trade agreement that “jeopardizes essential U.S. interests” (for Malaysia) or “undermines [the] Agreement or otherwise poses a material threat to economic or national security” (for Cambodia), the U.S. may terminate either agreement and apply the more punitive reciprocal tariff rates imposed on April 2 (Article 5.3.3).
Finally, all four agreements contain language regarding cooperating on duty evasion, and both the Cambodia and Malaysia agreements contain vaguely-worded provisions regarding rules of origin, which provide that “if benefits of this Agreement are accruing substantially to third countries or third-country nationals, a Party may establish rules of origin necessary to achieve the Parties’ intention for this Agreement[]” (Article 4.1).
While none of these provisions in and of themselves pose an immediate risk to producers in these countries, read collectively, and together with provisions on export controls and sanctions, they demonstrate a novel approach to trade with Southeast Asian partners which, if implemented, will have wide-ranging implications for producers in the region. Of course, the ongoing trade dispute between the U.S. and China provides the subtext for many of the provisions in this agreement. The U.S. approach appears to be to use the prospect of higher reciprocal tariffs as a coercion tool to prevent Southeast Asian trading partners from deepening ties with China. The U.S. has already applied a similar approach in the area of trade remedies, where expansive anti-dumping, countervailing duty, and anti-circumvention laws allow the U.S. to target Chinese investment in third countries. Therefore, producers in these countries which rely on Chinese suppliers or have ties to Chinese companies should expect additional scrutiny from the U.S. if not their own governments as a result of these agreements.
(5) Enforcement and Legal Barriers
None of the four agreements clearly address how they are to be enforced. The Cambodia and Malaysia agreements provide simply that, “[i]f a Party considers that the other Party has not complied with a provision of this Agreement, the Party may review the terms of this Agreement and take action in accordance with applicable domestic law” (Article 7.4). Many aspects of the agreements, particularly the provisions regarding economic and national security measures to be taken by Cambodia and Malaysia, are extraordinary in scope and will be difficult to implement in full. As a practical matter, though, the only concession provided by the U.S. as part of any of the agreements is a reduction in the reciprocal tariff rate. Because the reciprocal tariff rate is determined unilaterally and with little to no procedural hurdles, these four agreements should best be seen as enforceable at the discretion of the White House. Given the ambiguous nature of many of the provisions in the agreements, and the erratic nature of U.S. trade policy under President Trump, the potential for unilateral enforcement by the U.S. will be a source of unpredictability surrounding these agreements.
Yet another source of unpredictability is the question of whether reciprocal tariffs will be struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court listened to argument regarding the legality of reciprocal tariffs on 5 November. The argument invoked several constitutional doctrines which will have greater constitutional ramifications. As such, opinion is split as to whether the Supreme Court will uphold the reciprocal tariffs. Further, it is unclear when the Supreme Court will decide the matter, although some experts have predicted a judgment as early as December 2025.
If the Supreme Court strikes down the reciprocal tariffs, President Trump will still have a number of tools at his disposal to effectively replace those duties. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 enables the President to take any action necessary to enforce its rights under a trade agreement or to prevent unjustifiable and burdensome commercial practices by other countries. Section 122 of the same law allows the President to impose duties of up to 15% on all articles imported into the United States to deal with balance-of-payments deficits. Both of these authorities, while imposing some additional procedural hurdles, more explicitly address the core grievances meant to be remedied by reciprocal tariffs. At the same time, the U.S. is currently carrying out an unprecedent number of investigations under section 232 of the Trade Act of 1974.
This is all to say that reversal of reciprocal tariffs by the Supreme Court, at least from the United States’ perspective, is unlikely to nullify the trade agreements. Nonetheless, we will continue to provide updates on the Supreme Court’s decision, the presumed finalization of the Thailand and Vietnam trade agreements, and any further developments that arise.
